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1 Introduction
Consider the following fictional discourse from Weatherson (2004):
(1) Jack and Jill were arguing again. This was not in itself unusual, but this time
they were standing in the fast lane of I-95 having their argument. This was
causing traffic to bank up a bit. It wasn’t significantly worse than normally
happened around Providence, not that you could have told that from the
reactions of passing motorists. They were convinced that Jack and Jill, and
not the volume of traffic, were the primary causes of the slowdown. They all
forgot how bad traffic normally is along there. When Craig saw that the cause
of the bankup had been Jack and Jill, he took his gun out of the glovebox and
shot them. People then started driving over their bodies, and while the new
speed hump caused some people to slow down a bit, mostly traffic returned
to its normal speed. So Craig did the right thing, because Jack and Jill
should have taken their argument somewhere else where they wouldn’t
get in anyone’s way.
The final, bolded sentence of (1) is jarring. So much so that our engagement
with the fiction seems to break down. Why should this be, given that much of
what we find in fiction is strange, impossible, or immoral, without hindering our
engagement? For example, readers of Lolita may find Humbert Humbert repulsive,
but that doesn’t prevent them from engaging with the fiction, i.e. imagining as
prescribed by Nabokov’s text.
A related observation is that the bolded sentence of (1) seems false in the world
of the fiction. That is, it appears that the author of (1) cannot make it fictionally
true that Craig did the right thing. Why should this be, given that an author has
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the authority to turn a human into a bug (as in in Kafka’s Metamorphosis), invent
playing cards who are loyal servants to the queen (as in Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures
in Wonderland) and describe (truthfully in the fiction) a sociopath who robs, rapes,
and assaults innocent people for his own amusement (as in Burgess’ A Clockwork
Orange)?
Such questions are familiar from the rich philosophical literature on imaginative
resistance: an instance in which “an otherwise competent imaginer finds it difficult
to engage in some sort of prompted imaginative activity” (Liao & Gendler 2016).1
In this squib, we propose that some evaluative propositions, such as in (1), trigger
the accommodation of an (unreliable) narrator. It is well known in semantics that,
depending on various factors, accommodation can be more or less difficult for the
processor. (1) is on the extreme end of the difficulty scale for two reasons. First, right
up until the final statement, the story adheres to the standard conventions of a third
person omniscient narrative, i.e., without a specific narrating character in the story;
narrator accommodation forces us to break out of this frame, and reconceptualize the
story as told from a first person perspective. Second, the accommodation is triggered
rather indirectly, as opposed to a more explicit introduction of a narrating character
through a first person pronoun (cf. ‘Call me Ishmael’).
In what follows we sketch a formal implementation of these ideas. In the next
section, we develop a toy analysis of fiction using a version of the dynamic semantic
framework of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp 1981). Crucial to our
analysis will be the idea from Lewis 1978 that in all worlds compatible with a fiction
there must be someone telling the story (“as known fact”). Our DRT/Lewis-based
framework for representing fiction allows us to distinguish first person or, following
Genette’s (1980) now standard terminology, homodiegetic narration, from third
person or heterodiegetic narration: only in the homodiegetic case is the narrator
represented explicitly by a discourse referent, on a par with the rest of the fictional
characters. In this way we try to capture the idea, well known from narratology
research, that heterodiegetic narration involves an “effaced” narrator that is not part
of the story and never referred to (e.g. by indexicals) in the fiction. Subsequently,
in section 3, we build on our toy analysis to include different update mechanisms
for dealing with both reliable and unreliable information. Combined with the idea
of accommodating a narrator discourse referent, this will allow us to analyze (1).
In section 4, we consider an objection from Byrne (1993) to the Lewisian modal
semantics of fiction underlying our DRS boxes, namely that there are narratorless
fictions. We discuss how to revise our Lewisian assumptions in light of the objection
and what this may mean for analyzing imaginative resistance discourses as instances
1 The notion of imaginative resitance is usually traced back to David Hume. It was revived, in large
part, due to work by Moran (1994) and Walton (1994) and responses to that work by, e.g. Gendler
(2000), Yablo (2002) , Matravers (2003), Weatherson (2004), Stock (2005), and Todd (2009).
2
of narrator accommodation.
2 Fiction in DRT
2.1 DRT
We take a standard version of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp 1981)
as our starting point. That is, in interpreting a discourse spoken or written the
interpreter updates an information state, represented in the formal language of
Discourse Representation Structures (DRS).
We’ll use a standard box notation for DRSs. By way of illustration, the box in
(2b) is meant to represent the information conveyed by the single sentence mini-
discourse in (2a):
(2) a. Farmer John owns a donkey.
b.
x y
farmer(x) donkey(y)
john(x) own(x,y)
The top compartment houses the discourse referents, i.e. variables representing the
entities that the discourse is about. The bottom compartment contains descriptive
conditions, expressing properties of, and relations between, discourse referents.
The syntax of the DRS language is just a notational variant of that of first-order
logic, and the model-theoretic semantics is static as well. The dynamic nature of
DRT resides in the way utterances in a discourse are interpreted as successive updates
on the discourse context. A single utterance doesn’t express a proposition but a
context change potential, i.e. a way to transform an input DRS, representing the
information conveyed by the discourse thus far, into an output DRS, representing
the information increase due to the current contribution.
To illustrate, say the mini-discourse in (1) continues with (3).
(3) He’s feeding it a carrot.
The DRS construction algorithm has to add the information of the new sentence to
the input DRS in (2). One of the key characteristics of the algorithm is its distinct
treatments of indefinites and definites: the indefinite a carrot introduces a new
discourse referent ‘z’ and accompanying condition ‘carrot(z)’ into the input DRS,
while the pronouns (he) and it are treated as anaphoric, meaning they introduce free
variables (u, v) looking for antecedents. Formally, anaphora are resolved by unifying
them with suitable2 antecedent discourse referents (u=x, v=y):
2 Suitable antecedents are salient, accessible, and matching in associated descriptive content and/or
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(4)
x y z
farmer(x) donkey(y)
john(x) own(x,y)
carrot(z) feed(u,v,z)
u=? v=?
;
x y z
farmer(x) donkey(y)
john(x) own(x,y)
carrot(z) feed(x,y,z)
The result is a new, model-theoretically interpretable DRS, representing the infor-
mation conveyed by the two-sentence discourse. This DRS then can serve as input
for the interpretation of a new sentence.
2.2 Fiction and narrators
To model the interpretation of fiction in DRT we’ll first need to distinguish two
basic kinds of narration. The first kind that we consider is called homodiegetic
narration, in which the narrator is herself one of the protagonists in the story, and
hence does not have full access to what other characters are thinking or doing behind
her back. The second kind of narration that we consider is called heterodiegetic
narration, in which the narrator is a more or less omniscient, unintrusive abstract
entity surveying the events occurring in the story world, including the protagonists’
innermost thoughts and feelings, and presenting them to the reader.3
Applied to DRT, we propose that the distinction between homodiegetic and
heterodiegetic narration comes down to the presence or absence of a discourse
referent representing the narrator. To see how this works, let us first consider the
DRS in (5), which represents a case of homodiegetic narration. Crucially, note the
intensional fiction operator, FICxϕ , interpreted as “in all worlds compatible with
fiction x, ϕ holds” (Lewis 1978).4
semantic features (van der Sandt 1992).
3 For present purposes, we don’t discuss various forms of second person narration and countless other
narrative experiments.
4 Cf. Semeijn (2017) for an account of how the interpretation of a fictional text leads to an information
update under the fiction operator, or Maier (2017) for an alternative account in terms of imagination
updates.
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(5)
x y
author(x) book(y)
melville(x) wrote(x,y)
moby_dick(y)
FICy
u v w
speaker(u) ahab(v) whale(w)
ishmael(u) captain(v)
The DRS in (5) represents the information that there’s an author, Melville, who
wrote a book, Moby Dick. In this book there is a speaker, the homodiegetic narrator
(henceforth: narrating speaker). There is also a whale, and so on.
Note that representing the narrating speaker in the way proposed makes it
possible to anchor local indexicals (I, here, now, today). For example, if the book
Moby Dick contained the statement I love the whales here, then the first pronoun
would pick out the narrating speaker, Ishmael, while here would pick out Ishmael’s
location.
A difficulty in making sense of (5) concerns spelling out the nature of the
accessibility relation of the fiction operator, i.e. when exactly is a possible world
compatible with a fiction told or written in our world? The first attempt that Lewis
considers is that a world w′ is compatible with a fiction x as told in w iff in w′ story x
is told as known fact and w′ differs less from w than any other world in which story
x is told as known fact.
One of the much discussed features of this approach is that we’re only considering
those fiction worlds that are closest to our own, a feature Lewis borrows from his
account of counterfactuals (Lewis 1973). In other words, all truths about the real
world automatically carry over to the fictional domain, unless contradicted by the text
(what Walton (1990) calls the ‘Reality Principle’). Questioning the adequacy of this
prediction, Lewis formulates another proposal where it’s not the actual world but the
overt beliefs of the author and his community that is the source from which implicit
fictional truths are imported (Walton’s ‘Mutual Belief Principle’). Either will do for
our current purposes. What concerns us is a different feature of Lewis’s approach,
viz. the fact in all worlds compatible with a fiction there must be someone telling
the story (“as known fact”). In standard narratological terminology, every story-
world has a narrator who is moreover distinct from the actual author, as they inhabit
different worlds. This view is controversial and we will come back to consider an
objection to it in section 4. In the remainder of this subsection, we would like to
show how adopting something like Lewis’s fiction operator allows us to represent
both homo- and heterodiegetic fictional narratives in DRT. Subsequently, in section
5
Daniel Altshuler and Emar Maier
2.3, we show how Lewis’s fiction operator allows us to relate Weatherson’s Death
on the Freeway discussed at the outset to a well known example of accommodation.
Let us, then, consider our proposed analysis of heterodiegetic narration in (6):
(6)
x y
author(x) book(y)
tolkien(x) wrote(x,y)
lord_of_the_rings(y)
FICy
u v
frodo(u) sam(v)
friends(u,v)
The DRS above represents the information that there’s an author, Tolkien, who wrote
a book, The Lord of The Rings, and in this book there are two friends, Frodo and
Sam. Crucially, notice that unlike in (5), there is no narrating speaker represented in
(6). Nevertheless, on account of our Lewisian modal semantics of FIC, there actually
is such a narrating speaker in all worlds compatible with the fiction. This non-
representational but semantically presupposed narrator captures the narratologists’
effaced narrator of a heterodiegetic narrative. The observation that such a narrator
cannot be referred to by an indexical such as I follows from the absence of a
suitable discourse referent for such a pronoun to be anchored to (assuming the more
or less standard anaphoric/presuppositional account of indexicals in DRT, Zeevat
1999; Bittner 2007; Maier 2009; Hunter 2013). Alternatively, the use of I in a
seemingly heterodiegetic context might also trigger a switch between heterodiegetic
and homodiegetic narration, by a process of accommodation, to which we turn next.
2.3 Accommodation
In this subsection, we would like to compare our implementation of the effaced
narrator idea to Barbara Partee’s missing marble:
(7) Nine out of the ten marbles are in the bag. #It is under the sofa.5
The first sentence in (7) entails the existence of a (contextually) unique marble not
in the bag, so why isn’t it possible to refer to this missing marble with a pronoun
like it? DRT’s answer is that a pronoun requires an antecedent discourse referent,
and applying the DRS construction algorithm to (7) does not lead to the introduction
of a discourse referent for the missing marble.
5 Cited by Heim (1982).
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The analogy to heterodiegetic narration, as we have analyzed it, is this: the
omniscient narrator is there in all worlds compatible with the fiction, just like the
marble is there as a matter of logical necessity. Yet it can’t be referred to by a
pronoun, because the DRS lacks a discourse referent representing the intended
antecedent.
As noted in debates about Partee’s marble, some tweaks (pause, extra infor-
mation, more descriptive content in the anaphoric expression) will allow us to
accommodate an antecedent discourse referent, rendering the discourse felicitous
(cf. Roberts 1989).
(8) Nine out of the ten marbles are in the bag.
a. I’ve been looking for hours and . . . hey wait, there it is!
b. {The missing marble/the red one/the bloody thing} is under the sofa.
By analogy, we would expect to find parallel cases of narrator accommodation.
In fact, whenever we pick up a book for the first time and don’t know in advance
whether the narration is homo- or heterodiegetic, we start without a narrator discourse
referent. If the first line we read is, say, ‘Call me Ishmael’, then we then have to
accommodate a discourse referent for the narrating speaker in order to interpret the
first person pronoun. Hence, many homodiegetic narratives require an initial narrator
accommodation.
More interesting are stories that start out showing tell-tale signs of heterodiegetic
narration (third person pronouns referring to protagonists, past tenses, lack of expres-
sives and indexicals, signs of omniscience, free indirect discourse thought reports
etc.), but then seem to switch to a homodiegetic style.
A first example comes from The wild ass’ skin by Honoré de Balzac, in which
the first section of the novel is clearly heterodiegetic, told from the point of view of
an impersonal and omniscient narrator. The story is about a young man, Raphael de
Valentin, who purchases a shagreen that will fulfill any wish of its owner, shrinking
slightly upon the fulfillment of each desire. The second section of the novel, however,
is clearly homodiegetic, told in the first person, from the point of view of the
protagonist Raphael de Valentin himself. This shift can be modeled within our
proposed analysis as involving accommodation, but not yet quite accommodation of
a narrator discourse referent. What we’re accommodating is merely the information
that De Valentin is now the narrating speaker, and hence the anchor for first person
pronouns and other indexicals. Formally, we add a descriptive condition of the form
‘spkr(x)’, where x is the already established discourse referent for De Valentin.
A narrative mode switch due to marble-like accommodation of a new discourse
referent halfway through the story also occurs, for instance in metanarratives, like
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the following:6
(9) Once upon a time there was no time. No time and no space. No heroes,
no plot, no drama, no obstacles, no twists, no turns, no hero’s journey, no
redemption, nothing to learn, nowhere to go, and no one needing to be saved.
The sky was blue. The trees were green. People danced for no reason,
sang like the birds, and looked up at the sky and down at the ground with
the same reverence. This was the time before story, before the need to
understand, make meaning, convince, persuade, teach, transmit, entertain,
distract, or make a single point. The point? It was already made. And
everyone already understood. Hmmm. . . I thought about writing THIS story,
but then it dawned on me, how presumptuous that would be, how full of
paradox, contradiction, Facebook Likes, Tweets, lists of things to do, copy
edits, me, cash projections, reviews, complaint, business, and all the other
assorted flora and fauna of life AFTER the story needed to be told. So I took
out the garbage, washed the dishes, and walked the dog. This is not available
on Amazon, nor will it ever be.
In cases like this, the only way to interpret the indexical pronouns (in bold) is by
accommodating a narrator discourse referent.7 This would mean reinterpreting the
whole story as essentially homodiegetic, i.e., told by an apparently not so impersonal
or omniscient narrator as we originally assumed on account of the heterodiegetic
style characteristics.
In the following section we add one final ingredient to our analysis, an account
of unreliable narration, before returning to Death on the Freeway.
3 Unreliable narrators and untrustworthy speakers
Narratologists note that a narrator can (and often does) say something that is false in
the fictional world (Booth 1961; Zipfel 2011). Examples include Huckleberry Finn’s
naive observations about society, or Chief Bromden’s hallucinations about growing
and shrinking protagonists in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. The question for
our toy analysis developed thus far, then, is: How do we separate what’s true in
fiction from what the narrator tells us? In order to answer this question, let’s first
consider what happens in regular conversation.
6 www.ideachampions.com/heart/archives/2014/06/index.shtml
7 In fact, interpreting the hesitation marker hmmm. . . already presupposes a person-like, non-omniscient
narrator.
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3.1 Unreliable conversation partners
In an ideal world where communication serves merely to coordinate our joint truth
seeking, any assertion that p should result in the hearer updating their beliefs with p.
But this is clearly an oversimplification of the way actual communication works. We
don’t always believe (or even just accept or commit to) whatever our interlocutors
say. Several paths have been explored for dealing with non-cooperative or otherwise
unreliable conversation partners,8 but for the sake of simplicity, we follow Eckardt’s
(2014) straightforward semantic proposal. Eckardt distinguishes different types of
updates: Trust updates and Cautious updates:
A Trust update is one in which the propositional content of the
utterance is added directly (by intersection) to the addressee’s beliefs
and the common ground. Other assertion situations will only support
Cautious updates. Person a asserts s, but addressee b updates her
beliefs with λw.Beliefa(w,p), where s denotes the proposition p.
Whatever we are told, we’ll always have to decide whether we believe
it or not. (Eckardt 2014:65-66)
As an example of a Cautious update, suppose a republican tells you (10):
(10) Trump has saved the middle class!
Hopefully, you don’t update your beliefs accordingly. Rather, it is suggested that
you perform a Cautious update, resulting in the following DRS:
(11)
x y
spkr(x) trump(y)
BELx save_middle_class(y)
In sum, in a Trust update we add information directly to the global DRS, as was
illustrated in section 2.1. On the other hand, a Cautious update is one where we add
information under a doxastic operator, as in (11). We interpret BEL-conditions as
modal statements in possible worlds semantics (Hintikka 1969), i.e. BELxϕ is true
in w iff ϕ is true in all doxastic alternatives of x in w.9
8 Most notably with the help of game theory (e.g. Asher & Lascarides 2013).
9 The distinction between Trust and Cautious updates is not meant to be exhaustive. In other cases we
might want to be even more cautious, as when we suspect that the speaker is deliberately lying to
us (or just bullshitting or trolling) that p. In such cases we might do a Supercautious update with p
resulting in the addition of the information that the speaker says that p.
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3.2 Unreliable narrators
If we distinguish Cautious updates and Trust updates in regular conversation, we
could do the same within the context of fiction interpretation. First in homodiegetic
narrative, when the narrator says something that is somehow inconsistent with the
story developed thus far or if we have other reasons not to trust the narrator, we
might not want to perform a ‘fictional Trust update’, i.e. take her words at face value
and adding her content as facts about the story world (as represented in the box
under the fiction operator). Instead, we might want to perform a ‘fictional Cautious
update’, and conclude merely that the narrator apparently fictionally believes this,
but it might not be fictionally true.
For example, in Chapter 3 of The Catcher in Rye, the first person narrator,
Holden, asserts that he is ‘the most terrific liar you ever saw in your life’. Shortly
thereafter, he tells the reader that he lives in a dormitory donated by an alumnus
named Ossenburger, who made all his money with cheap funeral parlors. Upon
hearing this, the reader is likely to perform a Cautious update, which we can represent
(roughly) as in (12):
(12)
x y
author(x) book(y)
salinger(x) wrote(x,y)
catcher_in_the_rye(y)
FICy
u z
spkr(u) ossenburger(z) holden(u)
BELu made_money_with_cheap_funeral_parlors(z)
Notice that (12) combines our proposal for analyzing homodiegetic narration in DRT
with Eckardt’s proposal about Cautious updates.
The more difficult cases to make sense of are ones that involve Cautious updates
in heterodiegetic narration. At first blush, this may seem like an oxymoron. If there is
no discourse referent representing the narrating speaker in heterodiegetic narration,
as we have proposed, then what would it mean to cautiously update, i.e., which
speaker’s beliefs are we supposed to update? The trick is that, as we’ve already seen
in section 2.3, a heterodiegetic narration can always switch into a homodiegetic one,
by accommodating a discourse referent for the (already implicitly present) narrator.
An accommodated narrator referent x can then serve as the anchor for the Cautious
update’s BELx-condition. Thus, after introducing a first person narrator, we can
always choose not to believe what that narrator tells us. This, we claim, is precisely
10
what happens in Death on the Freeway.
3.3 Death on the Freeway revisited
Let us now put all the pieces together. Before we get to the original Death on the
Freeway, first consider the following variant. The key manipulation is the use of
the first person pronoun in the final sentence, intended to bring out more clearly the
switch to homodiegetic mode.
(13) [. . . ] When Craig saw that the cause of the bankup had been Jack and Jill, he
took his gun out of the glovebox and shot them. People then started driving
over their bodies, and while the new speed hump caused some people to
slow down a bit, mostly traffic returned to its normal speed. I was there,
I saw it with my own eyes, and, as far as I’m concerned, Craig totally
did the right thing. Jack and Jill should have taken their argument
somewhere else where they wouldn’t get in anyone’s way.
While not as jarring, the final sentence still has shock value. The reader is forced to
lift the omniscience from the third person narrator and conclude that she is just a
character, and an unreliable one at that, as she seems to have a suspiciously immoral
view of the fictional world. On our account, the shock value would be explained by a
combination of two interpretive processes: First, the reader is forced to accommodate
a discourse referent for a first person narrating speaker in a discourse that started off
as a prototypical heterodiegetic narration. Second, the narrator’s claim that Craig did
the right thing clashes with our reconstruction of the story world thus far (based on
the textual evidence and the Lewisian principle(s) of minimal departure from the real
world or the author’s community’s beliefs, cf. section 2.2), so in an effort to maintain
a plausible and coherent interpretation of the whole, the reader will likely opt for a
Cautious update, adding the information that the newly discovered narrating speaker
(incorrectly) believes that Craig did the right thing.10 Skipping over the details, the
end result would look something like this:
10 An alternative interpretation strategy would be to trust the narrator and infer that the story is about a
very distant, immoral world, where killing someone like this really is the right thing to do. Presumably,
a story about such a world could be written, but we don’t think this is a very plausible interpretation
of (13).
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(14)
x y
author(x) weatherson(x) wrote(x,y). . .
FICy
t u v w
spkr(t) jack(u) jill(v) argue(u,v)
craig(w) shoot(w,u) shoot(w,v)
see(t,w)
BELt do_right_thing(w)
With this in mind, we are now ready to revisit Weatherson’s original, repeated
below:
(15) [. . . ] When Craig saw that the cause of the bankup had been Jack and Jill,
he took his gun out of the glovebox and shot them. People then started
driving over their bodies, and while the new speed hump caused some
people to slow down a bit, mostly traffic returned to its normal speed.
So Craig did the right thing, because Jack and Jill should have taken
their argument somewhere else where they wouldn’t get in anyone’s
way.
Without the first person pronoun that overtly signalled the narrative mode switch in
(13), it will be much harder for the reader to accommodate a narrator in (15). The
discourse preceding the last sentence doesn’t help since none of the characters can
possibly be the ones responsible for the immoral thought. All we have to go on is a
clash between our reconstruction of the story world, presumably somewhat similar
to our own in moral and other respects, and the information, from a supposedly
omniscient narrator, that Craig did the right thing in killing Jack and Jill. On our
analysis, this clash can be overcome, but there’s a high processing cost involved. We
need to first give up the assumption that we’re dealing with an omniscient narrator,
i.e. switch to homodiegetic by introducing an as yet unknown narrator referent. We
then furthermore have to decide that this narrator is unreliable, merely giving his
own, deviant opinion on what’s happening, as modeled by a Cautious update.
4 Concluding remarks
This squib proposed that the evaluative proposition in Weatherson’s Death on the
Freeway triggers the accommodation of an (unreliable) narrator. Given the lack of
descriptive content supporting such an accommodation, it is extremely difficult for
the processor. We note that we have not said anything about what accommodation
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really amounts to in terms of processing. We also note that there are various kinds
of accommodation processes. We have focused on the kind of accommodation that
arises in Partee’s missing marble example. This, we think, is sufficient to make
our proposed analogy with the imaginative resistance case under consideration.
However, ultimately, one would need to say more about accommodation11 and the
plethora of other examples which have been argued to be instances of imaginative
resistance.12
In drawing the parallel with marble accommodation, our analysis crucially relied
on the corollary of Lewis’s proposal that in all worlds compatible with a fiction there
must be someone telling the story. Byrne (1993) has provided some compelling
objections to Lewis’s proposal, arguing (among other things) that in many fictions it
is not true in the fictional world that there is someone sufficiently knowledgeable
to tell the story. And in these fictions, we have a story without a storyteller. For
example, there are possible stories about the universe ending or about uninhabited
empty spaces, where there couldn’t be a narrator.
While we do not have a knock down argument against this objection, several
comments are in order. First is the question of whether narratorless stories, if they
exist, could ever lead to imaginative resistance effects of the kind considered here.
Interestingly, Weatherson claims that Death on the Freeway is a narratorless story
and would thus provide an affirmative answer to this question. But is Death on
the Freeway really a narratorless story? Following Genette, narratologists typically
maintain that every story, by definition, requires a teller, who is committed to the
assertions in the text (cf. Ryan 1981; Margolin 2012). In the case of fiction, the
narrator can’t be the author, as that would entail that, e.g. Tolkien is committed to
the existence of hobbits, but must be somehow residing in the fictional universe,
overseeing things happening there. On this narratological assumption, Death on the
Freeway would certainly have a narrator, implicit at first and, as we have proposed,
explicitly represented as a character in the end.13
Still, let’s suppose that, contrary to Lewisian and contemporary narratological
assumptions, Death on the Freeway is, in fact, a story without a narrator. To
preserve our chief insight, that imaginative resistance can be explained in terms of
unreliable narrator accommodation, we only need to weaken the Lewisian semantics
by removing the ‘told as known fact’ restriction, i.e., we define the accessibility
11 For instance, it may be that Weatherson’s own analysis (involving Fodorian lower and higher concepts)
will shed light on the accommodation effects that we proposed.
12 See Liao & Gendler 2016 for a recent overview and Altshuler & Haug 2017 for a discussion of
examples that are directly relevant, involving discourse reanalysis.
13 If we assume that Death on the Freeway is a story with a narrator, then it remains an open question
whether narratorless stories, if they exist, could ever lead to imaginative resistance effects of the kind
considered here.
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relation of the fiction operator as: w′ is compatible with fictional discourse x in w iff
the fictional discourse x is true in w′ (and w′ is maximally close to w etc.). The rest
of our analysis will go through: Death on the Freeway still involves accommodation
of an unreliable narrator. What we lose is the analogy with Partee’s marble. In a
way, the accommodation involved in this version of the theory is even harder, as we
have to conjure up a narrator out of thin air, rather than just introduce a discourse
referent that was implicitly already available. Unfortunately, a proper understanding
of the varieties of accommodation strategies and their limits is still missing. We
hope that future progress on these general semantic/pragmatic matters will help us
decide whether this route is viable. For now, we hope that our squib at least shows
that it can be rewarding to try and apply our familiar semantic tools to topics from
neighboring fields, like aesthetics and narratology.
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